The Cultural and Creative Industries: A Critical History

The era of the cultural and creative industries, which can be said to date from 1997, brought together many different approaches to culture around an urgent call for recognition of a new reality that was «out there» and that represented the future, change, renewal and the revitalisation of the economy. However that energy for change was gradually eroded by a number of factors that reduced their initial expectations. Those factors included absorption by real-estate development, their own ability to integrate rapidly into new digital, media challenges and the scant intellectual and financial resources earmarked by most local authorities for their development. This article tracks the complex, disputed accounts of the «cultural and/or creative» industries and seeks to establish if not what they actually are at least why they are worthwhile in terms of political effort, i.e. how they came to be a «cause for concern», and what type of new concern they may now have become.

La época de las industrias culturales y creativas, que podríamos datar en 1997, combinaba muchos planteamientos culturales diferentes en torno a la urgente llamada a reconocer una nueva 'realidad que estaba ahí', que representaba el futuro, el cambio, la renovación y la revitalización de la economía. Sin embargo, esa energía transformadora fue erosionándose por ciertos factores que quizás rebajaron sus expectativas iniciales. Entre ellos podemos citar su absorción por el desarrollo inmobiliario, su propia capacidad para integrarse con rapidez en los nuevos desafíos digitales y mediáticos, así como la escasez de recursos intelectuales y financieros que la mayoría de los gobiernos municipales ponen en su desarrollo. En este artículo se sigue la pista a las complejas y contestadas narrativas sobre las industrias 'culturales y/o creativas', para tratar de establecer, si no lo que son 'en sí mismas', al menos por qué son una apuesta política que merece el esfuerzo. Es decir, cómo llegaron a ser 'motivos de preocupación' y qué clase de nueva preocupación pueden ser ahora.

Kultura- eta sorkuntza-industrien garaia 1997an hasi zela esan dezakegu. Bada, garai hartan, hainbat kultura-planteamendu nahasten ziren 'bertan zegoen errealitate' berri bat aintzatesteko premiazko deiaren inguruan, etorkizuna, aldaketa, berritzea eta ekonomia suspertzea azaltzen zuela errealitate berri horrek. Hala eta guztiz ere, energia eraldatzaile hori apalduz joan zen, hasierako itxaropenak agian txikiagotu egin zituzten zenbait faktoreren ondorioz. Honako faktore hauek aipa daitezke, besteak beste: higiezinen garapenak *xurgatu* izana, erronka digital berrietan eta komunikabideen erronka berrietan bizkor integratzeko duen gaitasuna eta udal-gobernu gehienek hori garatzeko erabiltzen dituzten adimen- eta finantza-baliabide urriak. Artikulu honetan hurbiletik aztertu dira 'kultura- eta/edo sorkuntza-industriei' buruzko teoria konplexu eta eztabaidatuak, ahalegina merezi duten apustu politikoa zergatik diren ezartzen saiatzeko, 'berez' zer diren ezartzen saiatu beharrean. Hau da, jakin nahi dena da zergatik izan ziren 'kezkagai' eta nolako kezka berria izan daitezkeen gaur egun.

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Index

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1. INTRODUCTION

Approaches to the cultural and/or creative industries tend to take two forms. One identifies a set of institutions and practices (a 'sector' or an 'industry') that demands our attention in some way, often against a background of their previously marginal position. A second takes a more 'constructivist' perspective, highlighting an active process whereby an object is created or assembled by or through policy discourse(s). Those taking the former approach tend to be 'in favour' of this new sector, calling on us to recognize and respond to it; those taking the latter tend to be more circumspect, identifying in its process(es) of construction a range of policy agendas not all of which might be welcome. It would be easy to identify this divergence as that between (uncritical) policy-makers and (critical) academia, as did a recent work (Anheier and Isar, 2011). However, this would be to ignore evidence of support and circumspection in both these groupings. This counter-positing also hints at some divide between positive action and critical commentary which is equally illegitimate. There are 'activists' and 'commentators' on both sides too.

Looking back over forty years of policy and academic (and indeed 'activist') writing on this topic it seems clear that these two approaches are not mutually exclusi-

ve; they represent different narratives or rhetorical tropes that have been used (often by the same person) in different situations. The former positions the creative and/or cultural industries as harbingers or catalysts for something new, 'out there', demanding recognition, investigation, promotion; they point to the real, the urgent, the exciting. The latter does not decry the activities to which the concept points (a position taken by cultural conservatives, by a certain kind of Marxism or by mainstream economic skeptics) but the ways in which these have been shaped, co-opted, maybe high-jacked, by different policy agendas. It is then tempting to range these approaches across a scale. At one end we can see purely empiricist attempts to define and map the sector, usually statistically, the more to pin down and establish its 'value'. At the other the term becomes an 'empty signifier', a stake in the game between competing interests who wish to provide the content that most suits their objectives. As such one can be a 'disinterested' agnostic about the term, or see it as a mere symptom (or mask) of a deeper tendency (such as 'dumbing down', 'or globalization', or 'neo-liberalism' or 'precarity').

However, this would be to position those evoking a catalytic emergent sector as naïve realists and the constructivists as reflexive and critical. There is inevitably something of this involved, in a move from immediate presence to some complex, perhaps contradictory, mediated reality. But rather than a simple passage from 'dupe' to 'worldy-wise', or the unmasking of error or illusion, we could follow Jameson (in the different context of 'realism/modernism') and see the move as a kind of dialectical thickening, or putting the first 'realist' concept 'under erasure', somehow co-present with the 'constructivist' (Jameson, 2002). Or, following Latour (2004), we might say our task is less the iconoclastic undermining of immediate 'matters of fact' (exposure of illusory naturalness, revelation of deeper 'invisible' causality) and more the attempt to deepen our understanding of 'matters of concern'. For example, it is glaringly obvious in the constant terminological stumble of 'cultural and/or creative' that our concern here involves something more than simply a new sector 'out there', to be 'nailed down' by yet another definitive definition. Yet that something new *has* demanded our attention —has become a matter of concern - in this last forty years is unavoidable— the 'digital revolution' providing the most recent such wake-up call (if we still needed it).

In this article I want to trace the complex and contested narratives around the 'cultural and/or creative industries', to try to establish if not what they are 'in themselves', then at least why they are a policy stake worth the struggle. That is, how they became 'matters of concern' and what kind of new concern they might now be.

2. HISTORIC REVIEW

Forty years ago puts us in the early 1970s, when 'the cultural industries' began to emerge as an object of academic and policy concern. Given the subsequent academic focus on frictions between culture and economics we need to emphasize that, at this time, it was the issue of culture and politics that was primary. Or rather, economics was registered mostly in terms of social inequality or class which gave differential access to the media —a problem for liberal pluralist theories and for social democratic notions of the 'public sphere' (Habemas' (1989) influential work on this was published in 1962). This connection between culture and politics was to become ever closer as the notion of 'ideology' began to move beyond its crude reductionist use in the political battles of the Cold War years, acquiring a more complex set of 'cultural' meanings to account for the continued existence of 'capitalism', the 'status quo', the 'establishment' and so on. It was the political consequences of 'the culture industry' that had been most prominent since its inception in a post-war USA by Adorno and Horkheimer (1979). For them the term represented the final reduction of the realm of culture to the logic of monopoly capitalism, resulting in the extension of the control of the worker to the sphere of everyday life. No longer just dominated at work the worker was also programmed during the leisure hours by 'conditioned response' entertainment that simply relaxed them in order to get them back on the assembly line in the morning. This thesis was wrongly, though inevitably, lumped in with 'mass society' theory, conservative anti-democratic cultural criticism and a certain kind of codified 'modernism'; by 1970 it represented a well-worn academic and policy trope.

The appearance of the 'cultural industries' as a more positive policy concern at the end of the 1970s was not some 'recognition' of the economic importance of commercial culture. Rather it was an opening up of a new kind of 'cultural political' space within what had previously been viewed by many in the policy establishment as degraded Americanized kitsch. This new cultural political space can be seen clearly in Augustin Girard's influential 1980 paper for UNESCO, written as head of research at the French Ministry of Culture (Girard 1982). Girard points to the huge commercial cultural sector and as a matter of urgency calls on the cultural policy establishment to take note. It was the same call as that made within the Greater London Council's (GLC) new left-wing Labour leadership, elected in May 1981 (Bianchini, 1987; Garnham, 1990)), and by Mitterand's new Minister for Culture Jack Lange in the same year (Rigby, 1992; Loosely, 1995). That is, that the vast majority of cultural consumption now takes places outside the subsidized sector; that the consumption of commercial culture was growing at extraordinary rates across all social levels; that traditional, subsidised 'live' cultural forms were (following Baumol and Bowen, 1966) economically incapable of satisfying this demand; and therefore a refusal to engage with this commercial sector was elitist and irresponsible. A cultural policy must engage with this sector to be democratic; it needs to engage with it in

order to challenge some of the more 'negative tendencies' within it. As a consequence Girard called for more research into the dimensions and dynamics of the sector; but three themes already stood out clearly.

First, a positive charge was now attached to the notion of 'industry' as a collective project; individual artistic practice had to be set within a wide range of professional, managerial and commercial services. Media and communications academics in Europe and North America had already established this within the mass media. In the USA the 'production of culture' school had begun to investigate how both 'popular' and 'high culture' was produced within complex socio-economic 'art worlds' in which the 'artist' was a constructed and contingent position (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). Bourdieu's work on cultural production and consumption had begun to open up similar ground in France. In the UK Raymond Williams (1981) had also become interested in the material 'industrial' conditions of cultural production and their historical trajectories . Indeed, a new kind of art history rejected the transcendental notion of the artists and placed the individual genius squarely back within her or his social and historical context (O'Connor, 2011). This recognition of the collective social basis of cultural production thus gave a strong democratic valency to the notion of 'industry'.

But, second, this industry was also about markets and profits, which raised difficult issues for cultural policy makers. These issues were outlined clearly in the mid-1980s by Bernard Miege (1979; 1987; 1989) and Nicholas Garnham (1990), both academics who had been close to the policy worlds of Jack Lange and the GLC. Taking direct issue with Adorno and Horkheimer's account they wanted to give a much more specific account of the cultural industries, not so much as capitalist *ideology* but as capitalist *industries* engaged in the production of cultural commodities at a profit. In contrast to the monolithic 'culture industry' and echoing similar findings by the 'production of culture' school, they identified a much more fragmented and disparate group of cultural industr*ies*. Their products could cut across the explicit political ideologies of the state in their search for markets; their need to make a profit demanded some degree of innovation not just formulaic repetition; and their very success in reaping profit from the exchange value of cultural commodities related, in part at least, to the ability of such commodities to provide 'use value' to their consumers. This opened up a more contradictory cultural space (as we shall see) and it also introduced those 'negative tendencies' of which Girard spoke. These included concentration, monopoly, cross-ownership, vertical integration, ever increasing levels of capitalization and so on. Girard had also pointed to 'imbalances' at the international level, anticipating later accounts of globalization. Finally, there was the position of the artists. Artists (or creative workers/ professionals as they were being called) had not been absorbed into some Taylorist culture factory, as Adorno had predicted, but remained a largely freelance workforce. For Miege and Garnham the continued independence of the artist was not a hangover from their

bohemian past (as Girard suggested) but essential for the profitability of the cultural industries - including free R&D, a 'reserve army of unemployed', flexible staffing and so on.

Third, alongside these negative tendencies we can see in this cultural industries moment a more positive appropriation of new technologies of production, reproduction and distribution. There was a strong sense of seizing hold of a democratic modernity —breaking with Heideggerian anti-technological 'culture critique' as well as the formalist aesthetics of post-war modernist orthodoxy. The 1980s saw a rediscovery of the thematics of inter-war left modernism, which had embraced the future promise held out by the forms and technologies of American and home-grown mass culture. This was a re-appropriation clearly made possible by the energies released by new forms of popular culture that had burgeoned since the 1960s. The embrace of industry and technology was necessarily accompanied by a revalorization of the market. It was clearly not just 'collective' production and technological reproduction/ distribution that counted here but its organization outside state subsidy and control, that is, in the market.

Thus the early 1980s saw left-leaning cultural policy makers embrace markets and technology, both of which had previously seemed to mark the boundary between art and commercial culture. Can we see this as a first repudiation of that 'elitist' opposition of arts /industry or culture/ capitalism that many claim for the 'creative industries'? To some extent this is so. The idea of a transcendental art(ist) untainted by commerce and aloof from the world of machines had been systematically undermined. Equally, social democratic politics were now much more open to the idea of markets and much more wary of the state. Garnham (1990), for example, was explicit in his claim that the market was crucial to a modern democratic cultural policy; how else could the production of and demand for culture be regulated? After all, how did one embrace commercial culture without somehow embracing the commerce?

But there were some key elements that mark it as very different from the 'creative industries' moment of the late 1990s. First, though the economic elements were to be embraced as a crucial dimension of cultural policy, the overall intention was their contribution to a more democratic culture rather than to 'the economy' per se. Girard's call to for more economic research was in order to guide intervention. The introduction of economic concepts such as the 'value chain', as well as the serious investigation of employment statistics and industry trends in this period, were to be used primarily to secure cultural ends. Second, these economic concepts and tools were there to correct 'negative tendencies' —issues of monopoly, exploitation, international domination and so on. They were there to protect against market failure —not the failure to achieve market success, as it became, but the failures intrinsic to the market mechanism per se. Third, though markets were embraced they were markets redefined— not the abstract neo-classical rational choice market but em-

bedded socio-cultural practices. They were part of a mixed economy, not so much the Keynesian 'commanding heights' model of the 1950s but one that had emerged from a decade of grassroots democracy and urban social movements, from the rapid decline of the political prestige of the state and the incipient energies of post-fordism. As we shall see, such an approach worked much better at local level, which is where some of the main strands of cultural industries policy-making developed. Looking at the energies and hopes invested in the cultural industries agenda by many local policy actors in the late 1980s, we might see in this embrace of markets and technology for a new democratic urban culture a re-invention, a final recall before it disappeared from view, of the great social-democratic and indeed socialist modernisations of the 1920s and 30s.

3. THE CULTURE VALUE

Interventions within the cultural industries requires information on the structure and dynamics of the sector —such is now routinely collected by governments, international agencies, policy consultants and media/cultural economists. The work of Miege and Garnham was groundbreaking in this respect; but their work also opened up another, seemingly peripheral, area which yet was to produce some fundamental conceptual shifts. Both coming from the Marxist tradition they were concerned to understand the cultural industries in terms of the classic opposition of use-value and exchange-value. Surplus value was produced when the worker was paid less for his labour than the price the products of his labour could command on the market. This difference —for the capitalist as well as for Marx the economist— could be more or less predicted on the basis of the 'socially necessary time' needed to produce a certain use-value. The problem was that for cultural commodities use-value was extremely difficult to identify, tied as it was to high levels of contingency and novelty. Equally, the labour time that went into the cultural product seemed (at best) only tangentially related to the final price of the product. This of course becomes a new kind of problem for 'post-industrial' economists and cultural theorists.

More directly it suggested that the cultural industries were faced with a very difficult business model. First, there was no way to predict use-value or exchange-value in advance, how the former might result in the latter, and the frequent disjunction between the two. Second, there was a tendency of cultural commodities to rapid obsolescence and to become public goods (the window of commercialization could be very narrow). Third, the labour required to produce these was extremely difficult to manage (hence the characteristics of artistic labour noted above). Miege and Garnham both outlined various dimensions of this problem and some of the solutions adopted to overcome them. These were later presented in more 'neoclassical' form by Caves (2000). What these accounts suggested was that the cultural industries operated very differently from the models of mainstream business theory

and practice. In the late 1980s and early 1990s this difference could serve as a sign that the cultural industries heralded a new kind of economy, in which the cultural moment would be of increasing importance. It fuelled an emergent, fragmented but confident policy coalition made up of creatives, various policy intermediaries, academics and administrators who saw the policy recognition of the economic importance of this sector as an acknowledgement of the centrality of culture to contemporary society. We will return to this below.

Another crucial aspect of the use/ exchange value couplet involved that fundamental critique of Frankfurt school model above: that the 'culture industry' had to provide some use-value to its audience in order to generate exchange-value. This identified a space for 'authentic' cultural value at the heart of commercial culture; but at the same time it was liable to distortion by the logic of profit (cf. Ryan (1992) for an exhaustive treatment of this). This dialectic of use/ exchange, cultural value/ profit and its multiple points of friction and contradiction, provided rich territory for exploring the dynamics of contemporary cultural production —how creative input, creative management and production, market research, financial accounting and so on are combined in a complex, fluid, conflicted collective process. This dialectic operated within large corporate entities (the main focus of Miege and indeed Williams) to whose growth in power and concentration both these and others pointed with alarm. But the GLC's cultural industries strategy was based on a recognition that large corporations controlled distribution and thus access to market, hence their power over the independent local cultural producers. The culture/ profit dialectic was thus reproduced across a whole sector. Indeed the spatialisation of this dialectic, both on a global scale and within the dense localized ecosystems of creative clusters, has been one of the most productive lines of enquiry in the last decade or so. Understanding how profit is generated within and across these complex spatial levels has proved easier, however, than developing policy tools to counteract those negative tendencies.

4. USE AND EXCHANGE VALUE

The issue of use/ exchange value thus raises some fundamental questions for any cultural policy which purports to engage with commercially produced culture: what constitutes this use-value and how can it be distinguished from exchange-value? In order to answer this we have to take a slight detour and situate the question within the shift, from the 1970s onwards, from 'arts policy' to 'cultural policy'. This is usually presented as a move from a 'narrow' to a 'broad' conception of culture. In the Anglophone tradition Williams' famous statement that 'culture is ordinary' (1958/1997) is invoked here, and of course the shift owes a great deal to the rise of cultural studies since the late 1950s. In France it relates more to Henri Lefebvre's work on 'everyday life', and crucially extended by Bourdieu and de Certeau in the

1960s and 70s (Ahearne, 2004). In general the policy shift is associated with a deepening of democracy —from the post-war social democratic concern to open up 'access to the arts' to more a participatory and interactive 'cultural democracy'. There is no denying the strong democratic content of such a shift but it is useful here to examine a core theme of this narrative, that which links the 'elitism' of art to its separation from 'life'.

Charges against art's social irresponsibility, elitism, solipsistic individualism, unconcern for the real world and so on are of long standing across the political spectrum, and these had been exacerbated by the formalist tendencies within modernism. The powerful attacks of the community arts movement —and urban new social movements of which they were part (Castells, 1983; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1994; Mayer, 2006)— on the 'arts establishment' revived themes of an older left modernism, but they also coincided with a philosophical and sociological challenge more fundamental than the long familiar critique of 'art for art's sake'. This challenge suggested that the originating claim of western 'aesthetic' art since the 18th century, that it had a transcendental access to a certain 'truth' was deeply ideological (cf. O'Connor 2011 for longer discussion). This ideological function was systematically analyzed by Bourdieu's 1974 *La Distinction*, a work which more than any other subsequent 'debunking' fixed the equation of art and elitism (Bourdieu, 1986). He suggested that the 'disinterest' which Kant saw as the defining characteristic of aesthetic reception, and which via Schiller was to become the basis for the 'autonomy' of art, was an expression of an emerging bourgeois 'habitus'. That is, it grounded the 'correct' ability to appreciate art in the 'higher' faculties which were freed from direct need or desire. The working class were thus excluded by their subjection to the lower passions and their need to labour. Art's claims to autonomy, and the faculties required to appreciate the 'free play' at its heart, were thus implicated in practices of social distinction and domination.

There are some huge problems with this account which we cannot address here; what is important is how this was used within cultural policy. To a left leaning cultural politics it suggested that the self-contained, separate 'autonomous' work of art needed now to take its place in a wider social context, in 'everyday life'. At the same time, it needed to recognize its material conditions of production, its relationship to 'economy'. In so doing its Apollonian 'disinterest' would give way to the Dionysian embrace of the 'lower' desires and interests, the business of political demands, the messiness of the market, and the unruliness of contemporary popular culture. Much of cultural studies comes from this. However, I would suggest that the autonomy of art is not secured at the expense of 'life', of the 'fallen' world, but against *culture* —a culture it sees as merely conventional, outworn, reified, debased. Ranciere (2009) has persuasively argued that the characterization of 'aesthetic art' as separate from life is incorrect— that to the contrary its history over the last two hundred years shows a constant dissolution of

the boundaries between art and life established by pre-modern artistic practices. Jameson (2002) also points to the constant, systematic, often agonistic exchanges between 'art' and 'life' in the modern era. The autonomy claimed by art has a disruptive, transgressive force used not against 'life' but against the fixed, conventional forms of culture that mediate it. In this sense it is art, not 'culture', which asserts the radical heterogeneity of its domain of activity from the conceptual and administrative languages of economics, politics, the law and so on.

This can be clearly seen in two crucial areas of the post-war cultural policy settlement. On the one hand we have an art which had become a privileged representation and exemplification of national cultural identity. On the other we have an 'autonomous art' whose relationship towards such a national identity (or at least the conventional cultural expressions of such) was frequently ambivalent if not antagonistic. These two elements were highly disjointed, as the inter-war years showed, with 'autonomous art' (equated more or less with modernism) suppressed by totalitarian and right-wing authoritarian regimes. Cultural policy after WWII was an attempted social-democratisation of this national cultural heritage. The decision to subsidise the arts was not (only) to take art out of the grubbiness of the market (although, of course, if you were already in the market then you disqualified yourself from being taken out) but to prevent art becoming the exclusive domain of the wealthy. Hence the crucial links to the expansion of education, public museums, libraries and so on. At the same the promotion of a new cannon of modern art (increasingly internationalized in the context of the Cold War and the Marshall plan) involved a set of values much more ambivalent than the conventional humanism of a 'common artistic heritage' evoked by writers and policy makers such as Andre Malraux (Cf. his 1951 *Voices of Silence*). These values included a radical, anarchic experimentation; a concern with the formal demands of the artistic medium; an avoidance of 'uplifting' humanistic content (and indeed content per se); a rejection of social and ethical conventions; and a refusal to position their work in relation to explicit political and economic rationales.

The move from 'art' to 'culture' might thus be seen as a widening of an elitist, autonomous art to embrace the messy, grounded realities of 'ordinary culture'; but it should be clear that this widening was also a migration. It involved the introduction of the themes of 'autonomous art' —what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) called the 'artistic critique of capitalism'— into 'new left' politics, resulting in new kinds of cultural demands and aspirations. We can see a transfer of many of the themes of modernism away from 'high art' and into 'culture'. In the radical community arts movements retrieving left modernism; in the urban social movements setting up new kinds of spaces and organisatons; in the artistic avant-gardes operating on the fringe of popular culture (and vice versa); in the transformation and expansion of higher education and the growth of radical cultural theory within it —in all these we can see not just the culturisation of art but also the 'aesthetisisation' of culture.

Here is the source of that urgency about a new 'out there', a rapid and volatile transformation of the practices of art and 'everyday' culture. Something is happening and we don't know what it is. The signifier 'cultural industries' was a way for policy makers to come to terms with this unknown 'out there'.

In the light of the above we might say that use-value becomes proxy for that moment of autonomy at the very heart of the cultural commodity form. It is no longer directly tied to the determinant centrality of the autonomous individual artist, it is a more collaborative, iterative, complex process, set within specific organizational cultures or ethos. Thus use-value's dialectical relationship to exchange-value is not to be seen as a constant war between cultural and financial value (though it can feel like this); neither of these are known values (more like 'known unknowns') and the ability to assign such (provisional) value is (unevenly) distributed and contested across the collective project. The autonomy of cultural use-value is not asserted against exchange-value *per se* (income as well as much professional esteem comes via the market) but at different points within the specific ethical, political and aesthetic context within which that profit is generated. Exchange-value is also a key mediator between the cultural autonomy of producers and the autonomous reception of the audience. This latter, as the 'active audience' approach has shown, has high levels of autonomy with respect to the intentions and value-predictions of the producers —they can refuse, adapt, 'detourn' an intended reading of a product in quite volatile ways. These readings feedback through purchase (or lack thereof) and other formal (market research) and informal ('word on the street') mechanisms —a process accelerated by the emergence of new information and communications technologies since the 1980s. We have a very different 'field of cultural production' to that of the older 'art worlds' and it still remains to be fully conceptualized, let alone inform existing cultural policy thinking. But to restate— this was not some repudiation or marginalization of autonomous art by 'entertainment' or 'popular culture' but the extension of many of its values into their heart.

This can be seen in those community arts and urban social movements which formed a 'new left' opposition to traditional arts policy, resulting in new kinds of cultural policy-making in mainland Europe (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993), in the new GLC and in radical cultural policy coalitions in North America, Australia and elsewhere. Demands around 'collective consumption' were extended to cultural provision, as well as for more grass-roots control over resources. Such expanded culture became 'aesthetic' —more autonomous, opaque, refractive, abrasive with regards to 'mainstream' culture. This was not simply a replication of the forms of 'difficult' modern art but was part of that transformative promise of the 'artistic critique of capitalism'. That is, critique which stressed not social injustice (though it did not deny this) but the inability of capitalism to satisfy those human demands for a meaningful life that were promised or embodied in the autonomous work of art. Rimbaud's call to *changer la vie* could be seen in Joseph Beuys as well as in the cultural currents of Punk and Post-Punk. Fur-

ther, this 'artistic critique' was no longer restricted to artists; though subsequently reduced to 'bohemian lifestyle' it initially brought new demands on work, new attitudes to careers, to social conventions, to the life-course and so on (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Urban centres especially underwent a sea change, as demands for a more 'meaningful life' produced new cultures of consumption and production. We can see a new *habitus* emerging; new urban cultural milieus in which new cultural aspirations were learned, as were ways of inhabiting these aspirations and of turning these into some kind of income (Raban, 1974; Zukin, 1982). It was these aspirations to a meaningful, democratic culture in common, coupled with the possibilities of gainful and meaningful work that gave the cultural industries signifier a utopian charge amongst activists, academics and policy-makers as it entered into a very different political era (O'Connor and Wynne, 1996).

5. A NEW CULTURE AND CREATIVE ECONOMY

It has been common to present the rise of the cultural and/or creative industries within the policy field in terms of the increasing emphasis on economic arguments for culture. This is a serious oversimplification. First, it overstates the continuities between any current economic emphases and the emergence of the cultural industries agenda in very different circumstances. Second, it ignores the transformative, oppositional and indeed utopian dimensions of some of its early aspirations. The cultural industries gave rise to a loose, fragmented and fluid coalition which harboured many contradictory ideas. We thus need to approach its trajectory in genealogical terms —of elements being brought together and transformed in unpredictable ways rather than as an evolutionary teleology in which 'the economic' finally dominates 'the cultural'.

Looking at the UK context we can see some of the ways in which the economic dimension of the cultural industries constantly changed valency within this emergent policy coalition. Economic arguments can be seen emerging early on. The GLC always asserted the significant employment and wealth generated by this sector. The emphasis on the small and local rather than the big and global aimed at retaining the economic benefits of cultural activity for the locality. Cultural democracy coupled with economic development was a win-win scenario central to most cultural industries advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s. Though this certainly involved pragmatic politics there was also an ambitious vision for an 'industry of the future'. Sheffield's 'Creative Industries Quarter' was one of the first attempts to explicitly link the cultural industries to a new urban future. However, in a period when the National Union of Mineworkers —headquartered in the city— had just suffered a catastrophic defeat, and the UK's Conservative government were pursuing a politically-motivated policy of de-industrialisation, the utopian vision of a new industry based on culture and technology had strong elements of pathos.

This pathos operated in three registers. The first was the continued belief —noted above— that a recognition of the economic importance of the cultural industries would also be a recognition of the importance of culture to this new economy. Such a recognition was not forthcoming from the Thatcher government. Second, it assumed possibilities for local economic development that persisted on the labour left (who controlled most of the large metropolitan areas) through the 1990s; that in a post-industrial world cities were uncoupled from reliance on natural resources and could mobilize culture and knowledge in more autonomous ways. Not only did this underestimate the centralizing ambitions of the Thatcher government, it overestimated the mobility of the cultural industries: they remained ever more concentrated in global urban centres. Third, the idea that industrial cities, at a time of rapid de-industrialisation —with its concomitant and chaotic re-organisation of local, national and global space— and facing a hostile government, could develop the intellectual capacity, policy tools and politico-financial resources to engage in the construction of a new kind of economy —one that might re-write the laws of industry-era economics itself— was always doomed. Such pathos characterized much of the policy coalitions that built up around the cultural industries before the election of New Labour in 1997. In many ways the cultural industries coalition acted as a kind of opposition in exile; but exile has its costs. The increasing reliance on economic arguments for the sector in order to gain any sort of policy traction was coupled with a need for a 'flakey' coalition to manifest its politically realist credentials. It was very easy in this context for pragmatics to end up as econometrics. But as we shall see, the creative industries moment coincided with a more 'right wing populist' version of cultural studies' critique of autonomous art; that its rejection of 'the market', 'industry', 'capitalism' and so on was of a piece with its anti-democratic elitism. The eradication of any friction or contradiction between culture and economy is a mark of the creative industries agenda and its space of possibility will be outlined below.

Other countries and regions had different contexts; but they were all dealing with de-industrialisation of the major cities, the sharpening of global competition (including the cultural industries), and the more general shift to the Right in the guise of neo-liberalism. Across all these we can see a general bifurcation between cultural industries policy at local and national levels —itself part of a more general re-organisation of intra-national space consequent on globalization. At the local level the cultural industries policy agenda became increasingly linked to that of 'culture-led urban regeneration'. Though levels of urban political and financial autonomy differed between developed countries, in general the capacity of city governments to deliver cultural industry-led economic regeneration strategies in the 1980 and 1990s was very limited. What city governments *were* equipped to do was to use their control over planning and public land to help promote a new wave of urban development in previously stagnant central areas.

It is here that the cultural industries agenda gained its real traction. Others in this volume will discuss this in more detail, but in the 1980s we can see how the marginal urban cultures of cultural production and consumption came to be recognized by city governments and real estate developers as sources of value. This initially involved the traditional arts institutions —who often had both more policy weight, financial resources and global branding potential. But the revamping of the infrastructure of the industrial city— train stations, warehouses, factories, schools, banks, mental asylums, hospitals, even the old railway tracks themselves —was increasingly extended to the cultural industries. They became target tenants as well as attractors —symptoms of a wider 'vibrancy'— in themselves. The presence of cultural industries in a building or area marked for 'regeneration' worked to enhance a real estate value which rarely flowed to those in these industries —or indeed the agencies established to support them. The Richard Florida (2002) phenomenon of the early naughties marked the point at which developers no longer followed creatives but now actively sought them out to populate their new developments. Indeed, they cut out the cultural production element —always slow and with uncertain profits— and went exclusively for up-market consumption (apartments, cafés, shops, gyms). Cities, happy to broker the deals, could then use these as signs of thriving cultural economy because the presence of such activities was statistically proven (by Florida) to indicate such. The capacity to deliver complex, multi-agency cultural economy development agendas remained very uncertain in North American, European and Australian cities.

At national level in the 1980s and 1990s the cultural industries coalitions were much more complex —involving a bigger range of interests— with ownership more fluid and dependent on shifting political circumstances. At national level the term comes nearest to that 'empty signifier' we noted in the introduction. In general there were two main thrusts: their centrality to 'national identity' and their contribution to the national economy. The first represented an extension of a traditional cultural policy theme, now no longer restricted to 'the arts' but taking in the full range of commercial and popular culture —and which was also a growing economic sector. To a certain extent this is a macro version of the local win-win scenario —a new national culture-linked image plus economic growth. At the same time it suggested a new prestige for culture, now admitted to the big policy table. In Australia, for example, the influential *Creative Nation* document launched by a modernizing Labor Party, and linked to a strong 'cultural policy' coalition of activists and academics, embraced post-1960s commercial and popular culture as central to building a new identity in a new era (Hawkins, 1993; Gibson, 2001). The cultural industries *and cultural policy* were to be promoted as essential building blocks to this new economically active national culture.

These kinds of arguments could be seen in various versions across Canada and Europe and they generated powerful images of modernity: of social, cultural and economic transformation. However, in these terms it was not easy for right-leaning go-

vernments to accept the cultural industries agenda as it stood. Indeed, this agenda could be made to seem defensive and backward-looking when set against another modernizing agenda which, though never grouped under the cultural industries agenda, was as influential in shaping the new landscape of the present. This was the radical and far-reaching process of de-regulation conducted under the auspices of 'globalisation' in the 1980s and 1990s (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). This complex and contradictory process - which involved the convergence of technologies and markets, an acceleration of media concentration and integration, and a coordinated attack on post-1945 national-cultural formations and the politico-regulatory structures which underpinned these – claimed much of the emancipatory change of the cultural industries, not in the name of cultural democracy but rather market freedom.

One of the key contradictions of this de-regulation process —at least for all but the USA as largest net 'exporter' of cultural commodities— reflected a wider issue around globalization with which it was explicitly coupled. On the one hand it was presented as an extension of free trade and thus good for all economies; but on the other there were highly symbolic areas of national identity and sovereignty that were inevitably threatened. Culture especially. Those in favour of de-regulation stressed the ending of state monopolies would expand the market for all; that hiding behind quotas and foreign ownership walls would lead to the protection of uncompetitive companies. They also suggested that 'narrow' national identity was no longer either viable or desirable in an age of globalization; or perhaps such national identity was not worth having unless it was secured within a global arena through competitive local industries. Here is not the space to rehearse all these, just to say that this deregulatory/ globalizing thrust seriously undermined the claims of the public sector and of the cultural industries agenda to enhance national identity (Turner, 2001). It certainly limited its options; it also undermined that link made by the cultural industries agenda between national identity and local production. The two were no longer necessarily related and even the pure economic argument —that a domestic cultural industries sector was good for jobs and growth— was seriously vitiated. Why not protect the car industry or mining? Thus from the perspective of a de-regulatory right wing neo-liberal agenda the cultural industries argument was economically marginal and politically suspect.

From where then did the creative industries agenda come?

6. CREATIVE INDUSTRY OR NEW CULTURE INDUSTRY

Though the cultural industry was associated with left leaning governments this has not been the case with the creative industries. The UK's 'New Labour' government coined the term in 1997, borrowing heavily from the forward vision of *Creative Nation*. But in Australia, for example, the creative industries agenda has been as-

sociated with the neo-liberal Howard government. Despite suspicions regarding its opposition party provenance it has nevertheless been adopted by the Conservatives in the UK and the Labor party in Australia. Across Europe it has been picked up by a range of political parties; and its rapid adoption across the very different contexts of China and East Asia, South East Asia, parts of Latin America and Africa (Kong et al, 2006), suggests the 'empty signifier' again. What does it signify?

One clear referent is 'modernity' or 'the future'; but we might say these are empty signifiers in turn, and that these have been under political dispute since 'conservative' parties became neo-liberal modernisers. However, we can see in the polyvalency of the creative industries the emergence of a right wing or at least neo-liberal claim to a cultural modernity traditionally associated with the left (indeed, often its last bastion). We have noted how the creative industries are presented as a reduction of culture to the economy; this is an over simplification if we do not recognize that this is a new kind of culture and a new kind of economy. Claims for a new cultural economy were part of the cultural industries agenda in the 1980s and 90s; indeed, the 1997 launch of the new creative industries agenda in the UK by a minister with newly conferred cabinet status (and whose title included the word 'culture' for the first time, rather than 'arts' or 'heritage') suggested its political apotheosis. The sense of a new post-1960s cultural renewal along with the recognition of a new cultural economic sector bringing local and national benefits was palpable (DCMS, 1998). This embrace of the new 'out there' against the older establishments of 'real industry/ proper jobs' and publicly subsidized art elites gave this agenda a powerful charge of youthful, generational change. Taking a genealogical approach however we might see how elements of the cultural industries agenda were hollowed out and charged differently, or repositioned in a different signifying system changing their meaning.

The use of 'creativity' is a case in point. The change from 'cultural' to 'creative' has been widely discussed. For some it was a recognition of the centrality of culture, simply written under the sign of 'creativity'; the terminological change was pragmatic and not central to the real 'out there' which it designated. For others it was nonsensical: did it describe an input or an output; what was not creative; how was science, technology or business creativity different to that of 'culture'; was there a different between creative and cultural industries —and art? I do not want to rehearse these here (cf. O'Connor, 2011); I would suggest that 'creative' is quite clearly being used as pertaining to culture —but to an aestheticised culture exemplified by (a now 'democratised') art. Through the term creativity, the autonomy claimed by art against established culture —its challenge to conventions; its avoidance or deliberate flouting of rules; its concern to follow its own aesthetic logic, its specific non-logical methodologies —now becomes part of the symbolic meaning-making capacity of all individuals. 'Creativity' takes a specific kind of aesthetic, autonomous art and turns it into a universal human attribute —now no longer the exclusive property of the artist and one that can be made available for a wider social and economic development.

This can be set against the shift within 'information society' discourse from a concern with an abstract individual cultural capacity to 'process knowledge and manipulate symbols' (Castells, 1989) acquired through formal education (and used as a standard measure of the quality of a local workforce) towards a more embedded notion of culture. This wider cultural capacity had complex historical roots which could not be (easily) replicated —and indeed, such 'tacit' or 'embedded' knowledge was part of their competitiveness and resilience vis-à-vis mobile global capital. As policy makers became more concerned with the demands of post-industrial innovation this cultural capacity —culture now in the sense of Williams' 'whole way of life'— was now to be mobilized as a key economic resource or identified as dysfunctional drag. Either way what often became important was the capacity to re-invent and mobilize local 'structures of feeling', or to transcend the past, to slough off constrictive social and cultural traditions. In this way Saxenian's (1994) well-known comparative study of Boston and Silicon Valley was crucially instructive. The reason the former became the innovative powerhouse despite the latter's high levels of investment was that it escaped the traditional social, cultural and institutional structures that gave the East Coast city a comparative stiffness. Similarly Granovetter's *The Strength of Weak Ties* (1973) overturned the worries of people like Robert Putnam (2000) about social solidarity and suggested that the lack of strong social bonds allowed for great fluidity of interaction and exchange and thus economic innovation.

The cultural capacity for innovation thus went beyond the ability to routinely 'process knowledge and manipulate symbols' toward the ability to operate along the edges of established rules. Management and business literature began to promote working 'outside the box', deliberately courting failure, chaos and disorder, using para-rational or intuitive knowledge, operating as a maverick and so on (Kelly, 1998). These new values or ways of working explicitly drew on the unorthodox and unpredictable practices of artists and visionary scientists. In fact the newly emergent notion of 'creativity' within business language was parasitic on these exemplary figures. This was so not just in the realm of 'blue skies thinking' and the breaking of established paradigms and ways of doing —the new figure of the entrepreneur also picked up the cultural capital associated with the artist as social rebel.

In the 1980s the Schumpeterian entrepreneur made a comeback against the Fordist 'organisation man' of the 1950s and 60s. It was part of a re-vamped neo-liberal attack on state corporatism in favour of the small business enterprise. The New Right positioned both itself and the entrepreneur as outsiders and rebels. Entrepreneurs worked at the edges of the system, pushed its boundaries, explored new territories, confronting ossified ways of thinking and doing. Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' therefore had clear links with the dominant account of cultural modernism: its iconoclastic, shock-of-the-new obsession with innovation (Anderson, 1984). During the 1980s entrepreneurs and artists often occupied the same pla-

ce in new management literature - as society's outriders, productive rebels who might glimpse the outline of the future. In these ways —mobilizing a local cultural capacity, using aesthetic art as exemplar for innovation, and transforming the bohemian counter-cultural producer into creative entrepreneur— art and culture, no longer recalcitrant to economic development, become resource (Yudice, 2003).

The consequences of these kinds of shifts can be seen in the extensive debates around cultural work (Cf. Oakley 2009). The promise of meaningful, autonomous cultural work has frequently resulted in (self-) exploitation; 'creativity' has been a way of shifting job market responsibility from governments to individuals; the creation of a culture in common easily becomes narcissistic self-promotion and the instrumental exploitation of social networks. I won't add to these extensive critiques here. What is crucial that urgent 'out there' which the creative industries discourse could mobilize. What transformed the artist-creative from exemplary role-model (avant-garde artistic practice as a model for innovative and entrepreneurial thinking in business) to real economic resource was the growth of the 'cultural economy' itself. Not just the expansion of cultural commodity markets *per se* —music, television, radio, publishing, film, visual arts, fashion, computer games and so on— but the increased cultural or symbolic content of functional goods and services. Product and interior design, 'experience value' in services, 'attention value' in marketing and public relations, cultural tourism, the growing role of web 2.0 based social networking within all of these —they were all part of that 'culturalisation of the economy' which Lash and Urry had announced in 1994. Therefore, though 'creativity' in general is deemed a core social value, because cultural or symbolic inputs were now a major source of value right across the economy then the particular skills, mindsets and working practices of those operating in this risky, volatile and maverick cultural/ creative industries sector would be at a premium.

It might be noted in passing that these kinds of transformations cannot simply be reduced to 'neo-liberalism'. There is a polyvalency around these themes which makes them unstable. For the neo-liberal agenda is not simply the prevalence of the 'free-market'; such an agenda marks the cultural policy struggles under the Reagan and Thatcher era —of de-regulation, cuts in subsidy and the insistence on economic justifications for art. The price of everything and the value of nothing etc. Neo-liberalism was introduced by conservatives —who saw the sixties counter-culture as antithetical to their project. This culture was 'anti-business' of course, but it also promoted social and cultural values which were detrimental to the traditional symbols of nationhood under which these early neo-liberal reforms were conducted. Hence the 'culture-wars' and the increasingly 'conservative' image of these inveterate modernisers. It was Clinton and Blair who saw the political availability of sixties counterculture to present a forward-looking agenda in which many of the themes of neoliberalism could be extended through and within the realm of 'aesthetisised' culture.

The new cultural economy involved new kinds and scales of commodification. But this was not the reduction of cultural use value to the universal equivalence of exchange. This new economy was built on recognition of cultural 'use value' and the skills and processes necessary to organize this. Hence the catalytic role with respect to the wider economy —generally demanding more 'experience', 'attention' and other service-industry qualities— claimed for the creative industries (Cunningham, 2002; 2004). The cultural use value is now linked to exchange value by extremely rapid, multiple and sophisticated circuits. Indeed, the integration of web 2.0 technologies into this process over the last decade has radically destabilized any remaining direct ownership of use value by the creative(s). Co-creation involved not just the direct input of consumers into the creative process; the very act of consumption and the technological ability of machines and organisations to track and analyse such consumption allows the generation of new value. The cultural product now gains an almost Adorno-esque objective existence apart from its creator; but it is its very distinctiveness, its evasion of equivalence and disruption of established rules which is the source of its economic value (Lash and Lurry, 2007).

In this logic the aesthetisisation of culture becomes Lash and Urry's 'culturalisation of the economy'. The opposition of cultural use value to exchange value no longer works as it did. In the creative industries creators don't fully create and rejecting exchange value can only be elitist; or to claim the role of the 'expert' which amounts to the same thing (Hartley, 2005). In this context ordinary culture can become suspect – innovative creative expression is easily set against traditional (local, national, religious, moral and so on) culture. In the notion of 'social network markets' there is no source of meaning other than that instantaneously manifested in particular conjunction of personal preferences creating 'value' (Potts et al, 2008; O'Connor, 2009). Its combination of methological individualism and the reduction of cultural value to exchange value represent the arrival of neo-liberal thought at the heart of cultural theory. Aesthetic autonomous culture represents the cutting edge of value-creation, the accumulative speed of multi-scaler capitalism. It is in this context that Julian Stallabrass (2004) can argue that contemporary art —art, high art, not 'culture'— is the purest expression of neo-liberalism.

7. CONCLUSION

In this article I have tried to approach the cultural and creative industries policy not from the perspective of an economic sector to which various technical support policies can be applied. Rather I have tried to outline the ways in which the they have emerged as 'matters of concern' for cultural policy. The creative industries moment which began in 1997 combined many different and contradictory cultural agendas around an urgent call to recognize a new 'out there' —one that represented the future, change, renewal. Though often received with some cynicism in the UK

around its explicit party political elements (cf. Harris, 2003) it contained an energizing imperative. I have frequently witnessed, in Russia, in East Asia and elsewhere, assemblies of the most econometric policy-makers, calculating the value-added of culture, alongside young, energetic 'creatives' kicking against ignorant and corrupt politicians, global corporations and smug arts establishments which they see as standing in their way —of making a living and making a new culture in common. These moments are not to be denied their power; just as the earlier moments of the cultural industries coalition cannot be dismissed because their value was recouped by property developers and city marketing departments.

In developed countries at least the 'artistic critique of capitalism' has now become domesticated, a resource for economists, developers and high minded idealists alike. The ability of the established corporate structures of the cultural industries to absorb the new social media and digital challenges, and the rapidity with which the new players became integrated; the association of creative work with new forms of exploitation; the absorption of the creative industries agenda into property development and the paucity of the intellectual and financial resources city governments (with some exceptions) put into their development —all these have very much undermined the transformative energies with which the creative industries agenda was first welcomed.

The ubiquity of cultural commodities and the easy access to the technologies of production and distribution is now taken for granted. Globalization is no longer the sole province of the de-regulators and off-shore outsourcing but also belongs to the post-national 'multitude' which —rather than being assembled *right now* under the banner of McDonalds or Benetton (Hartley, 1999)— demands work to give it form (Hardt and Negri, 2005). New kinds of cultural practice across the globe, concerned to create new spaces of possibilities and collaboration, can be seen as part of work to invent new kinds of social collectivities. They suggest a movement beyond autonomous aesthetic culture to a recognition of the social and ethical bonds within which this culture is produced. That is building cultural connections in a context —after neo-liberalism— in which 'traditional' (including Fordist industrial) cultures have been strip-mined and de-stabilised; in which 'conventional culture' now includes the urge to self-expression, creativity and innovation (often at the expense of any other consideration). This is clearly what is now at stake with the debates about self-control (Brooks, 2011), 'bigger-than-self' thinking, and even 'big society', to put together a social order rocked by four decades of economic modernization. As opposed to a conservative re-assertion of traditional values —deeply compromised by its neo-liberal turn— we might see the issue as creating a society of 'weak ties' conceived not as fragmented individualism but as an open, democratic social bond.

We can see this in the 'ethical turn' in design, where its association with the 'aesthetic' allure of the commodity is giving way to its application to social structures and process. So too is the general shift across what was once called the creative

industries towards sustainability —not just to 'green' production but to local markets and livelihoods and to the cultures which intersect with these. In these process older artistic values —of craft, time, patience, the determination by the object rather than self-expression, ethical-aesthetic communities— emerge. No longer just in North America, Europe and Australia but globally, the social and ethical dimensions of culture have been asserted against the purely economic, and the uncoupling of cultural workers from the agenda of the creative industries has gone on apace, if unevenly. This is the big 'out there' that should be a matter of concern. So far we don't have a signifier for it.

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